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  In mid-November, this Panel was constituted to investigate “whether the current rules for 
determining the market price in the California Power Exchange Day-Ahead market results in a 
fair and efficient price for electricity in California.”  To this end, we held hearings in New York 
City and San Francisco,
1 examined a substantial number of studies, official and unofficial, of the 
behavior of these markets during the last few years and the literature, academic and non-
academic, on the behavior of auction markets sufficiently to reach unanimous agreement on the 
response to the question posed to us.
2  
  In fact, the issue we were asked to examine was more specific than is suggested by the 
previous paragraph.  What we were called upon to decide was whether the successful sellers of 
power in the California Power Exchange Day-Ahead market should all receive the uniform, 
market-clearing price, as they do under the present rules, or, instead, their several bid prices—
that is, the prices at which each offered its energy blocks—typically referred to as “uniform 
pricing” and “pay-as-bid,” respectively.
3   
  The timing of our commission proved to be ironic.  Inspired by what was almost universally 
perceived as the progressively unsatisfactory behavior of the several associated deregulated 
California energy markets—characterized by frequent price spikes in both Summer 2000 and 
Winter 2000-2001—the performance of these markets has so deteriorated, exhibiting such 
                                                 
*  We wish to acknowledge the support of Doug Zona and Natalie Efland at Cornerstone Research in 
preparing this report. 
1  See Attachment 1 for list of witnesses who submitted statements. 







extreme price spikes both on and off peak, as to raise fundamental questions about the structural 
design of the deregulated industry if not about deregulation itself.  In these dramatically altered 
circumstances, the suggested remedy we were called upon to evaluate has paled in significance. 
  We were neither commissioned nor have had the opportunity to reach settled conclusions 
about other possible remedies, palliative or fundamental, for these unsatisfactory developments 
or to apportion responsibility between the structure of the deregulated market and other, external 
circumstances, such as high natural gas prices, unexpectedly rapid growth in demand, lower than 
expected availability of hydro power, extremes of summer and winter weather throughout the 
West Coast, plant shutdowns for maintenance and emission constraints, that would in any event 
have had painful consequences.  In these circumstances, it would be both premature and 
presumptuous for us to attempt to do so.  We confine ourselves therefore to answering the 
narrower but nevertheless important question posed to us, satisfied that a sensible answer to it is 
likely to be useful in assessing whatever other remedies, temporary or longer-term, are likely to 
be considered. 
  In sum, our response is that the expectation behind the proposal to shift from uniform to as-
bid pricing—that it would provide purchasers of electric power substantial relief from the 
soaring prices of electric power such as they have recently experienced—is simply mistaken.  
The immediate consequence of its introduction would be a radical change in bidding behavior 
that would: 
•  forestall those anticipated savings; 
•  introduce unmeasurable inefficiencies in the dispatch of power and impose new costs on 
generating companies, which would inevitably tend to increase rather than decrease 
average prices;  
•  tend to weaken the competition in generation that is the best safeguard against exertions 
of monopoly power such as may have contributed to the painfully elevated prices at 
times of peak demand; and 
•  impede—again to an unmeasurable extent—the expansion of capacity that, along with 
intensified demand-side response, is the only fundamental remedy for the recent poor 
performance of electricity markets in California.   
                                                                                                                                                             
3  “Pay-as-bid” might be better termed “pay-as-offered,” since generators submit an offer schedule, rather 







  In the following sections, we examine first the likely effect of a change from uniform price 
to pay-as-bid on bidding behavior and market performance in a competitive environment.  We 
then consider its likely consequences in an environment in which, as several s tudies have 
concluded, some generators have and have exercised substantial monopoly power, at times when 
demand presses hard on supply, either unilaterally or by collusion, explicit or tacit.  We do so, 
first, in terms of the relative susceptibilities of the two auction systems to exertions of that 
power; and, second, the likely effect of the proposed change on the fundamental remedy—the 
erosion of that power by competitive entry and expansions of capacity.  Finally, even though, as 
we have already pointed out, we are not in a position to recommend other, more promising 
remedies, we feel obliged, in view of our negative appraisal of this particular proposed “reform,” 
at least to mention other possible ones, among those already being widely considered, that seem 
likely to be more effective.   
I.    Pay-As-Bid vs. Uniform Price in a Price-Taking (Competitive) Environment 
  In this section, we examine the merits and drawbacks of these two bidding systems on the 
assumption—on which deregulation itself was predicated—that the wholesale electricity market 
is or can be effectively competitive.  We recognize, of course, that the argument for moving to 
pay-as-bid is typically predicated on the belief that the recent extreme price spikes have reflected 
the exercise of monopoly power, but reserve our assessment of the issue in that context for the 
next section.   
  Under the present uniform-pricing rules, suppliers in an effectively competitive market have 
every reason to bid approximately
4 their marginal opportunity costs f or energy
5 in each of the 
blocks of power that they offer.  They know that if any of those bids is rejected because there are 
sufficient lower bids to satisfy the demand, they will be better off, because they will not have 
                                                 
4  Bids will tend to deviate from marginal cost to the extent units of capacity are large relative to total 
load.  
5  In most cases the marginal opportunity cost is just the incremental cost of generating additional energy.  
For hydro power, however, it has little to do with physical operating costs, consisting rather of the 
revenue or value sacrificed by using or selling it today rather than later or in one place in California 
rather than elsewhere, both of which depend in turn on how full the reservoirs are and expectations 
about future prices.  Even for fossil and nuclear plants, the marginal opportunity cost may differ from 
incremental operating costs to the extent there are opportunities to sell the energy in other markets in 







committed themselves to sales at prices that fail to cover their avoidable costs.  More important, 
they know also that on their accepted bids they will receive the full benefit of whatever price 
above that level is necessary to equate demand and supply in the market,  regardless of the level 
of their own bids, permitting them to pocket the difference between their avoidable costs and the 
market-clearing price as a necessary contribution toward recovery of their fixed charges and 
profits. 
  Just as with the economic dispatch of power practiced by power pools—dispatching power, 
that is to say, in merit order of generators from lowest to the highest marginal cost output 
necessary to meet demand—the consequence is that power is supplied at the minimum cost, at 
each point in time.  (As for the behavior of costs over time, the theory of deregulation is, of 
course, that the pressures of competition will force generators to minimize their costs in order to 
maximize the profits they can earn from the competitively-determined market clearing prices.) 
And, so long as competition is effective (which condition, to repeat, we recognize is unlikely to 
be fully satisfied today), any generator that withholds power in hope, by so doing, of raising the 
market-clearing price and so earning monopoly profits, will find itself displaced by competitors 
bidding their own, lower marginal costs.  The only consequence for it would therefore be a 
sacrifice of the difference between the competitive, market clearing price and its incremental cost 
of producing the output it has withheld.   
  The naïve expectation of advocates of a shift to pay-as-bid is, of course, that since all the 
infra-marginal bids—the ones below the highest marginal cost output necessary for the sum total 
of accepted bids to satisfy market demand—will under uniform pricing receive more than their 
bid prices (by margins successively larger as the accepted bids range downward from the 
marginal, highest to the lowest cost), the change in the rules would simply wipe out those 
markups; that the average price purchasers will have to pay under pay-as-bid will incorporate no 
markup above marginal costs at all.  For example, if the successful bids for a particular hour 
were of equal blocks of output with incremental costs, successively, of $30, $40, $50, $60 and 
$70 per MWh, the market clearing price of $70 will under the uniform price system bestow on 
the successful bidders markups above marginal costs of $40, $30, $20, $10 and zero, 
respectively, and pay-as-bid will reduce those markups all to zero: the block bid a t $30, 







  The critical assumption is, of course, that after the market rules are changed, generators will 
bid just as they had before.  The one absolute certainty, however, is that they will not.  Knowing 
that unless they changed their bidding practice under the new system they would receive only 
their avoidable costs on their successful bids—yielding them no contribution to their fixed or 
common costs, let alone profits—they obviously will universally change their practice 
immediately, bidding instead at what they expect will turn out to be the market-clearing price—
$70 in the foregoing simple example. 
  To the extent that the several bidders were able perfectly to predict the market-clearing 
price, in short, the savings from the change in the rules for consumers would prove to be zero.  
The only difference between the average prices actually realized under the two systems would, 
therefore, be the extent—and only the extent—to which their predictions proved to be mistaken.
6 
  Setting aside for later consideration the possibility that pay-as-bid pricing might be more 
effective in curbing exertions of monopoly power—if there is no reason to expect that prices will 
be consistently higher or lower under pay-as-bid, what other effects would the change be 
expected to have? The main ones seem to us the following:  
1.  Pay-as-bid introduces some inevitable reduction in efficiency as generators find themselves 
forced to depart from bidding their marginal costs if they are to receive any compensation 
for their fixed costs or contribution to profits.  With all bids exceeding the marginal costs of 
all blocks of power, by amounts that depend upon the varying estimates of the several 
bidders of what will prove to be the marginal, market-clearing bid, the perfect, total cost-
minimizing merit order dispatch will, inevitably, no longer be assured: some lower-marginal 
cost bids will be rejected—because their bidders have overestimated the market-clearing 
price—in favor of other, higher-marginal-cost power offered with more conservative 
markups.  Since so very much is at stake in terms of the bidders recovering their total costs 
                                                 
6  The Treasury conducted an experiment, in which it employed both uniform pricing and pay-as-bid 
mechanisms in the sale of Treasury bills.  It found mixed results, and could not conclude that the 
average winning bid prices of the two mechanisms differed significantly.  See, for example, Christine 
M. Archibald and Paul F. Malvey.  “Uniform-Price Auctions:  Update of the Treasury Experience.”  
Working Paper, U.S. Treasury, 1998.  Gregory Belzer and Vincent Reinhart.  “Some Evidence on Bid 
Sharing and the Use of Information in the U.S. Treasury’s Auction Experiment.”  Working Paper, 







or any profit, and since the constantly changing demand and supply conditions that will 
determine the market clearing price are in important measure unpredictable and the ability 
of the several sellers to predict them likely to differ substantially, their several bids will vary 
correspondingly in the markups above marginal cost that they incorporate.  With bids 
selected, then, on the basis not just of the marginal costs they reflect but also of these 
varying markups, the consequent inefficiencies stemming from departures from merit order 
dispatch of their plants are likely to be large.  
  Inefficiencies will not be a consequence only of forecasting errors if bidders differ 
substantially and consistently in their relative marginal costs.  In that case, occasional 
inefficient outcomes are a consequence of rational strategic bidding.
7  For example, if there 
are two bidders with uncertain costs—uncertain in the  sense that the individual sellers do 
not know the costs of the other—and one is known to have lower costs than the other on 
average, the bidder likely to have higher costs will rationally bid less aggressively, with a 
smaller markup over its operating costs than the bidder with lower costs; the latter will feel 
free to incorporate a larger markup in its bid, because it knows its rival is relatively unlikely 
to underbid it.  The consequence will be that the disadvantaged bidder will be called on to 
supply too often, because it will have submitted a lower bid in some instances  in which it 
has higher costs than its more efficient rival. 
  Moreover, the more competitive the market—the larger the number of competing 
bidders on the supply side—the greater the resultant inefficiencies will be.  Suppliers with a 
large complement of generating stations would continue to draw upon their several plants in 
the correct rank order, on the basis of their respective marginal costs.  The greater the 
number of separate generating companies, in contrast, the greater will be the number of 
instances in which output will be drawn from the higher marginal cost generator in 
preference to a lower-cost one, because the owner of the former had bid on the basis of a 
more conservative prediction of the what market-clearing price would turn out to be.  In any 
industry, competitive or otherwise, it is consumers who end up bearing the costs of such 







2.  Another inefficiency inescapably introduced by moving to pay-as-bid would be the cost of 
forecasting market prices that it would impose on all participants.  Under the uniform, 
market-clearing price system, as we have seen, sellers have every motivation to bid their 
marginal costs, which are of course readily available to them.  The change in the method of 
remunerating them would introduce large uncertainties into their calculations and 
correspondingly large costs of attempting to minimize or dispel them by forecasting what 
the market-clearing price or prices would turn out to be.  These costs, too, would ultimately 
be borne by consumers. 
3.  Finally, and in a sense worst of all, it is likely to discourage competition—to which 
consequence we now turn. 
II.  The Effect of the Proposed Change on the Exercise and Dissipation of Market Power  
Once we move from the assumption that generation markets are effectively competitive to 
the more realistic assumption that they are, at best, only imperfectly so, it becomes necessary to 
try to decide, first, whether uniform price or pay-as-bid is likely to be more conducive to the 
exercise of such market power as some of the incumbent suppliers may possess and to the 
dissipation of their power over time. 
A.   Small bidders are disadvantaged under pay-as-bid 
Under the uniform price rule, competitors prosper or fail on the basis of their relative 
generating efficiencies alone; that is not only a consequence but also a prerequisite of an 
effectively competitive market.  Under pay-as-bid, their profitability depends heavily also on 
their successful forecasting.  From the standpoint of making generation markets more effectively 
competitive, even more troublesome than the effect of pay-as-bid in creating uncertainties and 
imposing the costs of forecasting would be the differential relative burdens of these uncertainties 
on small and large firms.  There are large economies of scale in the efforts to gather the requisite 
information and make such forecasts on a continuing hour-by-hour and day-by-day basis.  The 
small firm would have to mount the same kind of effort, with the same dimensions, as a large 
                                                                                                                                                             
7  See, for example, Eric Maskin and John Riley.  “Asymmetric Auctions.”  Review of Economic Studies, 







one; and if those efforts prove to be necessary (and the behavior of participants in such markets 
suggests a general belief that they are), the cost per unit of output would be much greater for the 
small than large competitors.  Not only will the uncertainties introduced by pay-as-bid tend to 
discourage the investment in additional generating facilities that is one major part of the essential 
long-term remedy of the industry’s present poor performance, it will have an especially 
discouraging effect on investment by small firms, the economic feasibility of which was an 
essential premise of deregulation itself.
8  
There is a particularly ironic aspect of the relationship of these two alternative pricing 
methods on the prospects of smaller generators challenging the larger incumbents.  One powerful 
impetus behind the proposed shift is the conception—which we will proceed to assess—that the 
uniform pricing system is susceptible to gaming by large bidders, withholding their supplies in 
times of anticipated shortage in order to lever up the uniform price that under that system they 
receive on all their accepted bids.  But under uniform price, smaller competitors likewise benefit 
from any such exertions of monopoly power: they too automatically receive any 
monopolistically-elevated prices.  We do not wish to make too much of the point, since we will 
conclude that the proposed reform would not substantially alter that situation, in itself.  To the 
extent that it does have such an effect, however, it will almost certainly be disproportionately at 
the expense of smaller competitors, who do not have the ability to game the system themselves 
or have direct knowledge of  the games large bidders may play or be planning to play, and 
therefore to reflect in their bids the anticipated leverage effect of such tactics on price.  Under 
uniform price, no such forecasting is necessary: the monopolistically leveraged price 
automatically goes to all competitors alike. 
To the extent, then, that the present markets are insufficiently competitive and the success of 
deregulation depends—as indeed it does most fundamentally—on making them more 
competitive, the proposed shift to pay-as-bid  is almost certain to be not only ineffective but 
counterproductive. 
                                                 
8  This could be mitigated—to what extent we are unable to judge—by allowing “average price” bids (i.e. 







B.   The relative susceptibility of uniform price and pay-as-bid to monopolistic gaming 
A substantial number of responsible studies have concluded that the extreme price spikes in 
recent years, at times when demand would in any event have pressed hard on available capacity, 
were magnified by some large generators “gaming” the system: knowing in advance that 
supplies were going to be short at those times (because demand was going to peak), withholding 
some capacity that they would otherwise have bid, in the expectation that it would increase 
prices.
9  For a generator to benefit from such a strategy several conditions must hold.  First, 
demand must, in the aggregate, be inelastic.  Second, the generator must control a mix of 
capacity such that withholding a unit from the market will lever up the market clearing price 
received by its other, successfully bidding units sufficiently to more than compensate for the 
sacrificed net revenue on its withheld capacity.  Observe that it does not require a high degree of 
industry-wide concentration for this kind of “gaming” to take place, given the very thin margins 
of excess capacity at the times of peak demand and the extreme inelasticity of demand in the 
short run.  In these circumstances, it takes only a modest amount of withholding relative to the 
size of both the entire market and the total capacity of the game-playing generator.
10  The 
                                                 
9  See, for example, Paul Joskow and Edward Kahn.  “A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior In 
California’s Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000.”  November 21, 2000.  Robert 
Nordhaus, Carl Shapiro, and Frank A. Wolak.  “An Analysis of the June 2000 Price Spikes in the 
California ISO’s Energy and Ancillary Services Markets.”  September 6, 2000.  Severin Borenstein, 
James Bushnell and Frank Wolak.  “Diagnosing Market Power in California’s Restructured Wholesale 
Electricity Market.”  August 2000. 
10 It might appear that the effect of such exertions of market power would be indistinguishable from the 
effect of a rising peak demand in a situation of inadequate capacity even under pure or perfect 
competition: firms with no market power would likewise be expected to withhold capacity in 
expectation of soaring competitive prices.  That would indeed be expected in any other industry, in 
which supplies withheld today can be sold tomorrow at prices hugely increased by these withholdings.  
It would not be true, however, in the case of electric power: power that is not offered in the market 
today cannot be stored and offered tomorrow (hydro generators may be an exception).  The small 
generator who withholds in this way, in anticipation of higher prices tomorrow, simply loses the sales it 
could have made today and, therefore, the difference between its marginal cost of generating that power 
and the market price.  Only a generator with aggregate capacity greater than the anticipated shortage 
could profit by sacrificing some portion of the sales it is physically capable of making in the 
expectation of gaining more from the consequent increase in the difference between the newly-elevated 
market price and its own marginal costs on the sales that it does indeed continue to make. 
  On the other hand, the fact that prices at such times may exceed the marginal operating costs of the 
least efficient generator in use—the usual indicator of monopolistic withholding of output—does not in 
itself prove that monopolistic withholding has occurred:  when demand reaches the absolute physical 







withholding can take two forms: (1) physical withholding—not bidding some fraction of one’s 
operable capacity, or (2) economic withholding—bidding some fraction of one’s operable 
capacity at a price markedly above its incremental cost.  Both can have the same outcome: a 
higher clearing price.  
This kind of behavior has lent plausibility to the proposal to substitute pay-as-bid for 
uniform market-clearing prices.  It is only the prospect, under the present system, of receiving on 
all their sales the benefit of the increase in market price caused by withholding some portion of 
their capacity that the large generators engaging in that practice can expect to profit from it—so 
goes the reasoning.  Under pay-as-bid, in contrast, such generators would have to bid the 
estimated monopolistically elevated price on all their proffered sales in order to reap those gains, 
at the immensely increased risk
11 that some or all of those higher bids will prove to have been 
excessive and therefore be rejected, with a consequent loss of the entire difference between their 
actual marginal costs and the ultimate market price.  The proposed change in the pricing method 
would, by this reasoning, therefore dramatically alter the balance of risks and potential gains of 
such exertions of market power.
12 
Just as the naïve expectation that a shift to pay-as-bid will produce a dramatic reduction in 
the average prices consumers pay ignores the certainty that generators will radically alter their 
bidding practices to frustrate achievement of that result, so here, the expectation that it would 
discourage monopolistic withholding by changing the balance of risks and potential benefits, 
fails to take into account the ways in which bidders will respond by changing their bidding 
behavior correspondingly.  If and to the extent that monopolistic withholding has occurred in the 
past, bidders would henceforward, under pay-as-bid, attempt to predict the consequent behavior 
of the market prices in their several bids and, to the extent they succeed, the anticipated gains for 
consumers will prove to have been illusory. 
                                                                                                                                                             
whatever level necessary to equate supply and demand:  the more inelastic the demand, in these 
circumstances of an absolute limit to supply, the greater the margin by which the market price can 
exceed marginal generating cost. 
11 This risk is not great at peak times, with little aggregate excess capacity.  It is much greater off-peak. 
12 See, for example, Giulio Federico and David Rahman.  “Bidding in an Electricity Pay-as-bid Auction.”  







We are somewhat skeptical also of the claims that pay-as-bid pricing will diminish the 
ability of the parties to collude tacitly to increase prices.
13  A bidding process that is repeated 
daily is precisely the kind of game that lends itself to such collusion; changing the pricing rule 
would not alter that.  Indeed, recent experiments conducted at Cornell University, University of 
Arizona and CalTech all suggest that experimental subjects learn how to collude tacitly under 
either pricing rule. 
There is however one important difference between the two rules.  The large generator, 
knowing that it is or will be withholding and when and by how much it will be doing so, is likely 
to be in a much better position than the small generator to anticipate the results of that 
withholding and incorporate those anticipations in all its bids.  In this respect, once again, the 
shift to pay-as-bid will discourage the increased competition that is a critical part of the long-run 
remedy.   
Another possibly important difference is the greater transparency of bidding behavior under 
uniform pricing than pay-as-bid in detecting collusive or quasi-collusive pricing.  The 
monopolistic behavior we have described heretofore has consisted in withholding of capacity, 
unilaterally, collusively or quasi-collusively.  Instead, it could take the form of collusive or 
quasi-collusive bidding.  Such behavior would be far more readily detectable under uniform than 
pay-as-bid.  Since, as we have already emphasized, if the market were competitive all bidders 
would have every incentive to bid approximately their true marginal costs under the former 
system, and since costs—at least marginal operating costs—are easily measured to a first-order 
approximation in the electricity industry, the bid data would clearly  provide evidence of 
imperfect competition.   
Under pay-as-bid, in contrast, every seller would be forced to bid above its marginal cost, 
even if the market were perfectly competitive.  So there would be no direct way for observers to 
identify from the bid data parties that appear to be exercising market power.  Although it is 
                                                 
13 Natalia Fabra.  “Uniform Pricing Facilitates Collusion: The Case of Electricity Markets.”  October 
2000.  Carlos Vazquez, Michel Rivier, and Ignacio J. Perez-Arriaga.  “On the Use of Pay-as-bid 
Auctions in California: Some Criticisms and an Alternative Proposal.”  IIT Working Paper IIT-00-







difficult to assess the value of this additional transparency, it is another advantage of uniform 
pricing. 
III. The Proposed Change in Confrontation with the Fundamental Causes of the 
Unsatisfactory Performance So Far and Other Possible Remedies 
As we have already suggested in our introduction, the causes of the unsatisfactory behavior 
of California markets since deregulation are far deeper than the particular method of 
remunerating bidders in PX markets.  Assessment of the required palliatives or remedies is 
correspondingly more complex. 
The fundamental causes are, clearly, the inadequacy of generating capacity in the face of 
unexpectedly sharp increases in demand throughout the West, intensely aggravated by soaring 
prices of natural gas and of pollution emission permits, extreme weather conditions, a return to 
more normal levels of precipitation, with a consequent diminution in the accustomed quantity of 
hydroelectric power, all in confrontation with an extreme short-term inelasticity of demand.  
These would have produced sharp, painful increases in wholesale prices, both on average and 
particularly at time of peak demand, regardless of the method used for determining the 
compensation of bidding suppliers.   
The proposed change in those rules that we have been asked to evaluate would in our 
judgment have at most only a slight effect in mitigating these problems and the pain they have 
inflicted on customers.  Indeed, we have concluded, it  would if anything introduce new 
uncertainties that would, on balance, discourage the expansion of capacity (particularly of 
smaller independents) that is one essential part of the fundamental remedy.  It would 
disadvantage smaller players in the market and undermine the competitiveness of the market that 
is an essential premise and precondition of successful deregulation.  Moreover, any such change 
would involve some transition costs and uncertainties for both the system operators and the 
market participants, and therefore further reduce the incentives to invest in new generation 
capacity. 
In rejecting this proposal as likely to be ineffective at best and, more likely, 
counterproductive, we by no means imply that other proposed actions—both palliative and more 







in our introduction, however, we refrain from attempting to assess these various possibilities not 
merely because that was not part of our assigned task, but more definitively because we have not 
had the opportunity even to attempt to reach an informed consensus about them. 
At the same time, we have formulated some at least provisional opinions about some of 
these alternative approaches, which we herewith describe.   
A.   Direct interventions to combat strategic withholding of supplies  
To the extent that large generators have engaged in strategic withholding of supplies in 
times of peak demand, with the effect of sharply increasing market-clearing prices, we concur in 
the suggestions of some of our witnesses that some agency—have the authority to investigate 
such incidents, to issue orders prohibiting such practices and to impose penalties.  If 
withholdings such as these were unilateral, it seems unlikely they could be attacked under the 
Federal antitrust laws; but organized exchanges do typically establish and enforce rules such as 
these, designed to ensure that they be free of manipulation. 
Market monitoring by teams of disinterested experts is essential to identify and correct 
market problems, whether the result of design flaws or lack of competition.  We applaud the 
ISO’s and PX’s use of independent committees (the Market Surveillance Committee and Market 
Monitoring Committee, respectively) for that purpose.  T his is critical when elasticity on the 
demand side of market is at best immature and at worst nil.  Without the ability of demand to 
respond to variable prices, those prices will be set entirely by the supply side and, apparently by 
a small number of players.
14  
B.   Long-term contracting 
The legislation deregulating the industry in California specifically required the three 
California IOUs, until such time as they sold off their generation, to offer all of their energy for 
sale through the Cal PX and ISO, thereby in effect receiving the market clearing price.  Until 
                                                 
14 This may appear to be an odd kind of deregulation.  The essential premise of deregulation is, however, 
that competition will effectively protect consumers from monopoly.  If the inadequacy of capacity, in 
confrontation with an extremely inelastic demand, has created opportunities for the exertion of such 







such time as the IOU’s had recovered all of their agreed-upon stranded costs, they were required 
also to purchase all of their energy through the Cal PX and to sell to their customers at a 
regulated rate intended to give all customers immediate benefits of deregulation—but that clearly 
had the effect also of discouraging competitive entry into their retail markets.  Only Sempra, of 
the three, moved beyond this first stage.  At the same time the legislature and the CPUC 
effectively prevented the IOUs from entering into forward contracts with generating companies 
for energy, evidently in the belief that only in this way could emergence of an effectively 
functioning wholesale market be assured.
15  For these and various other reasons virtually all 
energy for retail sale in the state of California has been purchased and sold in the spot market,
16 
instead of a large portion being hedged through forward purchases.   
Several parties, including, provisionally, FERC, have specifically urged that the two 
remaining IOUs be permitted to enter into forward contracts with generators.
17  Indeed, the 
Market Surveillance Committee recommends they be required to do so. 
                                                                                                                                                             
taking pains not to interfere with the longer-term corrective of additions to capacity and more effective 
demand-side efforts. 
15 The IOUs were able to purchase via forward contracts through the CalPX—but only through the PX—
after it first made block forward contracts available in July of 1999.  Although there are regulatory 
limits on the amount of forward positions that each IOU may take, they have not reached those limits, 
in availing themselves of this opportunity.  They may have been discouraged from doing so by their 
past experience with forward purchases in California, in both gas and electric, under which regulators 
forced them to absorb any losses stemming from the contract prices exceeding wholesale market prices 
while not being permitted to reap the benefits, when the contractual prices were lower.  
  In any event, what the IOUs are vociferously seeking is the ability to negotiate contracts directly with 
generators. 
16 We consider both the day-ahead and real-time markets to be spot markets.  Energy contracted more 
than one day in advance is traded in forward markets. 
17 “An essential remedy is the elimination of rules that prevent market participants from managing their 
risks.  Moving significant amounts of wholesale transactions into forward markets will (1) reduce 
reliance on spot markets, thereby directly reducing both the likelihood and the adverse economic 
consequences of pricing volatility; (2) eliminate the adverse reliability impacts that the ISO faces each 
day as its obligation to operate a real-time balance market has become transformed into operating the 
major commodity exchange at the last minute; (3) increase the likelihood of new generation entry 
because the uncertain revenue stream from spot markets will not attract the necessary capital 
investments; and (4) limit the ability of sellers to exercise market power in spot markets.”  Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission.  “Order Proposing Remedies for California Wholesale Electric 







The availability of unrestricted long-term contracting offers some promise of improving 
market performance, since it provides a wider variety of options to both buyers and sellers.  Its 
effect on average prices in the short run is likely to be modest, since forward contracts do not by 
themselves alter the immediate balance of supply and demand that, along with a possibly 
monopolistic withholding of capacity, has been responsible for the price spikes of recent months 
and years.  Those underlying price-inflating factors are likely to be reflected at least partially in 
the terms of any long-term contracts into which generators would be willing to enter.  
Nonetheless, long-term contracting with generators would  
•  limit the consequences of exercises of market power in the day-ahead and real-time 
markets;
18   
•  permit voluntary sharing between generators and their customers of the risks of extreme 
market fluctuations, which would in itself be of value to consumers at large;  
•  even more important, contribute to the ultimate solution of California’s problems, so far 
as the supply side is concerned, by offering generators, both existing and potential, 
assurances that could encourage them to make the long-term commitments involved in 
expanding capacity, and in particular  
•  help smaller entrants raise the necessary capital and b y so doing enhance the 
competitiveness of wholesale markets. 
As we understand it, the prohibition or active discouragement of contracting “outside” the 
ISO and PX had two purposes.  The first, to which we have already alluded, was to encourage 
the emergence of a competitive wholesale market that would separate the operation of the 
transmission system (the Cal ISO) from the effectuation of purchases and sales of electricity.  
The expectation was that requiring the vertically integrated IOUs to sell their generation through 
the PX and purchase their energy at the market clearing prices in that exchange (and in real time 
the ISO) would limit their ability to exercise market power.  Ironically, the restriction has 
apparently conferred some market power on the now-independent generators and exposed the 
IOUs and their customers to disastrous financial consequences of those restrictions. 
                                                 
18 The MSC contended additionally that the ability of generation unit owners to exercise market power in 
spot markets is increased due to a lack of significant forward contracting.  See, for example, Robert 
Nordhaus, Carl Shapiro, and Frank A. Wolak.  “Analysis of ‘Order Proposing Remedies for California 
Wholesale Electric Markets (Issued November 1, 2000)’.”  Market Surveillance Committee of the 







The second purpose of the Legislature and consumer advocates was to protect smaller 
customers from “cream-skimming”:  the fear was that if the competitive market were opened 
first to large customers, with whom generators could enter into long-term contracts, they would 
reap all the benefits of competition, using their purchasing power to sew up supplies at favorable 
rates, at the expense of the smaller customers who would be permitted to enter the market only 
later.  The error here was the apparently underlying conception that competition is a zero sum 
game:  that if buyer A benefits by taking advantage of it, it will be at the expense of buyers B 
through Z.  
An important way in which competition works in the real world, however, is by large buyers 
exerting their purchasing power to obtain favorable prices.  That is not a zero sum game:  those 
favorable rates are not typically obtained at the expense of smaller buyers, but help break down 
monopoly and collusive pricing structures, to the benefit of customers generally. 
C.   Promoting customer price response   
A critical deficiency in the California market, which we have already emphasized, is the 
unresponsiveness of demand to even radically changing prices. The decision to allow stranded 
cost recovery through the concept of “head room” and a rate freeze for most retail customer 
means that, as part of the legislative package, there is a regulated ceiling price for retail power.  
Moreover, this ceiling price contained a guaranteed reduction for all customers.  This reduction 
appears to have been sufficiently large to make it effectively impossible for a competitive 
supplier to enter the market and offer a sufficiently lower price to attract customers away from 
the IOUs. Few competitors entered and few customers switched; the IOUs retained the lion’s 
share of the load.  Thus, there is no effective downward pressure on retail prices.  Consequently 
prices to consumers are effectively fixed, and thus there is no demand based price ceiling on 
wholesale energy prices. 
Demand side responsiveness to price is essential to the operation of a restructured market; 
the promotion of increased efficiency in the use of electricity, in the long term, and a much more 
elastic response to short-term peak prices are clearly essential remedies.  Since, once again, we 
have had neither the commission nor the opportunity to do so, we are not in a position to make 







emphasizing how essential it is, if consumers are to modify their purchasing habits in response to 
extreme fluctuations in price and by so doing to moderate those fluctuations, that they either be 
offered inducements by their suppliers to permit their use of power to be curtailed or specific 
appliances to be rippled off for short periods of time by signals from the supplier and/or confront 
prices that vary with the correspondingly extreme fluctuations in wholesale prices, so that they 
can be induced to modify their consumption behavior accordingly.   
We are not in a position to offer a judgment of the cost effectiveness of the more 
sophisticated meters that would register consumption in units of time corresponding to the wide 
fluctuations in the prices their distribution companies must pay.  As we understand it, however, 
the high cost of the necessary real-time meters has heretofore precluded their use.  All we can 
say is that the behavior of power markets in California in the last few months must inevitably 
have shifted the balance of relative costs and benefits powerfully in the direction of making that 
kind of metering economic, and strongly recommends a reconsideration of the advisability of 
their widespread—indeed, to the extent possible, universal—installation, whether at the 
customer’s location or via ubiquitous, centrally controlled electronic metering.   
IV.   Conclusion 
In sum, our response is that the expectation behind the proposal to shift from uniform to as-
bid pricing—that it would provide purchasers of electric power substantial relief from the 
soaring prices of the electric power, such as they have recently experienced—is simply mistaken.     
In our view it would do consumers more harm than good. 
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